In reply to your message of "Fri, 01 Jul 94 22: 15:45 EDT."
             >
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 94 22:24:25 -0700
From: 

Zoli Fekete writes:
> > The relevance of Midway?  Pearl Harbor was Dec 7th, 1941.
>  The relevance of Midway in this context IMHO that it showed that the
> USA lacked neither the strength nor the readiness to enter the war with
> resolute force.
As Hercule Poirot might say "Ah, the exercise for the little gray
cells."

Do you really think that Budapest was, via dolphin--or perhaps
Japanese code--up-to-date in the ebb and flow of the Battle of
the Pacific?

According to your frere-en-combat AK, the inevitability of the
US joining, and dominating, the war effort was evident to
Noah, if not Adam, so why the delay until after Midway for YHO?

--Greg

In reply to your message of "Fri, 01 Jul 94 19: 19:06 PDT."
             >
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 94 22:40:13 -0700
From: 

> P.S.: What is a "pastcaster"?
And is a "pastcaster" also one who "cheapshots"?

--Greg

That VOA Focus on George Soros was quite a piece!  I noticed that the
program was sponsored by the RIAS Foundation.  Is this another of George
Soros affiliated outfits?

BTW, it just so happens that the latest Hungarian news digest propogated
on Internet (HIRMONDO) had a news item, also about Soros and his
intention to invest $50 million in Hungary in the near future.
Unfortunately, there was no word about what he was planning to invest
in but I am almost certain it wouldn't be in the manufacturing industry.
Can anybody guess what that might be?  My guess would be that he would
be investing in media, perhaps buying that second TV channel about to be
privatized?  Whatever that might turn out to be, I am sure however, that
him selecting this time to invest has something to do with the new
government taking over.  The Socialists after all are known to favor
Open Societies, aren't they?

Joe Pannon

I need this like a hole in the head. After reading something in some
magazine years ago about the percieved relationship about Sumerians and
Hungarians and jumping to the same conclusions as some of my esteemed
participants on the newsgroup, I started to look into the issue as a
disinterested bystander.
My first surprise came when reading one of Kramer"s book (he was sort of a
guru of Sumerian studies) that the Sumerian ia an agglutaning language
similar in that aspect to Turkish and Finnish. I do not recall that he
mentioned Hungarian, per se. Further along there seemd to be a
determination that they were not original inhabitants of the area, where
most of their residues are (the gulf area where the war took place
recently) but came from the north. If I remember correctly, it was based on
words and literary records relating to northern sources.
Further along in discussing the conversion from hyerogliphic to alphabetic
writing there was an example that the symbol for fish and ear (or hearing)
was the same. That stopped me for a minute, because i am not aware that
such thing exists in any other language beside Hungarian and it is not only
a word coincidence that is easy to find in the most unrelated languages.
Another word that may be intriguing is the word for flowing water in
Sumerian which is Duna, there are of course numerous others percieved by
those who are trying to directly relate the Hungarians to the Sumerians,
but I could never decipher where they got it from because for the
authorative Sumerian English dictionary only the first section of the A
words have been published by the U of Pennsylvania which is the formost
location of Sumerian studies in the US. There is a fairly large amount of
text translated into English and some fo it is quite interesting. In one a
teacher complains that education is going to hell, because the kids are not
learning enough, the teacher is not respected and not paid enough. That
much for change in perception through some 6000 years. Of course he may
have been upset also, because the Hungarian merlot was $3 a bottle.
In briefly paging through the first volume of the dictionary, which also
quotes texts to demonstarte the particular word use, I have not recognized
many common words, but the grammar and the language format was a little
more familiar.

If they really came from north of the area where they lived, it is possible
that at least grammatically they were related a few years back to the Ural
Altaic language groups. Everybody was wandering around in those days and if
the Indo Europeans colud get in between the currently Ural Altaic language
groups, it is possible that some folks who were related to that group went
south at some time.

I also used to be as definitive on these issues as some of my younger
friends on the net, but as older I get, the more I know, what I really do
not know for sure (even if I read a supposedly authorative tome about it).

So just because somebody wrote a bunch of BS about it, and sombody else
wrote another book calling the BS BS, does not mean that there is no
further need of academic research on the field. I was listening to some
exchanges where Dacian was connected to current Romanian on the basis of a
very few words, (besides which, we don't seem to have the foggiest idea
about Dacian) and zero knowledge of the grammar.

So if somebody is interested in Sumerian even for the possible connection
to Hungarian, please go back to the original investigators and see their
work before being discouraged by those who already know everything about
it.
I recommend starting with the publications of the U of Pennsylvania and the
original works af Kramer (maybe Cramer) relating to the Sumerians. Whatever
your friend will find, I will appreciate, if lets me know.

I recall some fairly well respected scientists from Hungary with a series
of publications in Nature that went something like this:
Positive halide ions.
Positive halide ions?
Positive halide ions!
in subsequent issues.

So as an advice from one who does not profess to know everything for sure,
good luck in digging in an interesting and (at least currently) non
politicised field. If it is kept on this newsgroup, we will be discussing
what Horthy had to with them sooner or later or what Horn is promising
relating to pro or contra Sumer. At least it is unlikely that Hungary will
invade or hurl through them, of course Tony can always blame the Hungarians
for their demise, then maybe they expelled them from their northern
homeland.

Regards,Jeliko.

Not to resurrect a naturally-dead thread, but a few days ago Andras asked
for a summary of the AJP Taylor controversy.  This will hardly be accurate,
as I haven't had time to go back and re-read the literature, but I've dipped
into a few things to refresh my memory.

First of all, the context is important:  Taylor's book first appeared in
1961, written during the late fifties.  At this time, obviously, the dominant
climate in WWII origins was fixed with certain attitudes (Hitler the evil
genius with the blueprint for world domination, Chamberlain the spineless
dupe, "appeasement" the immoral policy of being "soft on dictators") that
had direct relevance to contemporary _politics_ as well as the specifically
historical questions.  How often even today do these symbols enter our
current political rhetoric: Munich, "peace in our time", Hitler, a toothbrush
moustach, a rolled-up umbrella, "appeasement"?  (Just think back to the media
at the time of the Gulf War).

Taylor's picture was vastly different.  In many ways he stood the received
attitudes on their heads, and moreover he did it in prose that was finely-
crafted, witty, often bitingly sarcastic, memorable, even hyperbolic.  The
book made a splash, far beyond academic circles (I believe questions were
even asked in Parliament about it--for purposes of comparison, I don't think
a single member of Congress knows that mine just came out :-(! ).

Taylor insisted that Hitler did not pursue policies planned in advance, but
behaved like any other politician (I do not use the adjective "unscrupulous"
before this word, because for Taylor that would be a tautology)--he reacted
to the actions of others, evaluating every situation as it arose asking what
he could get out of it.  In a sense, Taylor insisted on Hitler's _lack_ of
uniqueness (btw, he did not minimize Hitler's essential evil, though this
criticism has been leveled at him), insisting on placing him in the ranks of
earlier German leaders like Bismarck and Wilhelm II, and treating him as part
of the German problem that seemed to be Taylor's major focus of study.  So,
in a way, Taylor insisted that Hitler had to be seen as a product of Europe
and its system of international relations, not as an evil genius for whom
even the Germans as such could hardly be held responsible.

Similarly, he insisted that Chamberlain et al. were not spineless fools,
but statesmen in the traditional mold, good men with good intentions, even--
who, when they took actions, often created results directly the opposite
of those intentions.  What's more, he pointed out they enjoyed the overwhelm-
ing support of their electorate in their actions.  Appeasement assumed in
Taylor's account a very different quality from that still assigned it in
political rhetoric.

Overall, his book was also provocative in conception:  he returned to the
narrative, and focussed on the major personalities.  No discussion of the
great underlying forces (remember Trotsky's throwaway line about Napoleon?),
but an insistence that history should focus on the actions of actors and the
results of those actions.  And this process was for him full of contradiction,
irony, unexpected and accidental results.  In the final analysis, one could
probably see his book, in fact, as an indictment of the whole system of
international relations as it has developed over the last few centuries.
He keeps returning to parallels with previous statesmen and previous epochs,
insisting that thus it is in international affairs.  This wider indictment
may help explain the enduring impact of his book.

One more suggestion for further reading (none of us has anything else to do,
right ;-)?):

Gordon Mertel, ed., _The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: the
         A. J. P. Taylor debate after twenty-five years_ (Boston: Allen &
         Unwin, 1986).  The book is a selection of essays about the major
         themes and events of Taylor's book, as evaluated by current
         history, showing where nowadays people give him credit, and where
         they still feel he needs correction.

OK, back to directly Hungarian topics! (BTW, I could cull the Taylor-esque
take-downs of Hungarian politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
if anyone wants to see an example of his caustic style in action...)

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew

Dear Greg, comrade-in-grey-cell

>Do you really think that Budapest was, via dolphin--or perhaps
>Japanese code--up-to-date in the ebb and flow of the Battle of
>the Pacific?
 I am not talking about ebb and flow, but the major strategical
picture: the Japan and USA entering the war is as big a splash as it
could get, wouldn't you say?

>According to your frere-en-combat AK, the inevitability of the
>US joining, and dominating, the war effort was evident to
>Noah, if not Adam, so why the delay until after Midway for YHO?
 They say one's better off with an Uzi, but my only combat is on the
chessboard anyways :-). I am not a social scientist, so I hardly ever
use the word "inevitability" ;-(, but it seems like a very high
probability that from the late thirties the USA did not intend to
remain really neutral; even if they chose to stick with the appearence
for a while, it should have been been considered likely by any
responsible politician, after Munich at the least, that they would do a
lot for Chrurchill and against Hitler - and Churchill was squarely
behind the Russians after Hitler turned on them (and of course behind
the Yugoslavians as well when Hungary first joined the war).
 But of course you never have to wait for my VHO ;-); I just mentioned
Midway, half-jest because foreseeing that particular event of course
would've required fortune-telling (and that battle involved an
incredibly high amount of luck for the Americans). Still, that a major
win crippling the Japanese could occur (and only half a year after
their surprise attack seriously damaged the fleet in Hawaii) indicates
that even then - before a big buildup - the USA fleet was not something
easily toyed with. And the strength of a navy (the surface units in any
case) is most readily available information potential enemies such as
the good admiral Horthy's government could learn.

 In addition to the objective analysis, I have here in my hand a list
;-) of those who back then concurred with my little gray cells's
opininon of late. Let's see what US Navy Admiral James O. Richardson,
Commander Battle Force in 1940 and Commander-in-chief later, says in
his book (On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor - Chapter IX: Command of the
Battle Force, United States Fleet 1939-1940).
 Since you said something to the effect that I have to either defend,
explain or withdraw my quotes ;-(, here is my wit (or is it spin ;-))
on it: the USA had been long preparing for the conflict in the Pacific;
beside that they still had attention and resources to commit to the
Atlantic side as well.

JOR=      On March 9, 1939, when I learned I was to command the
JOR= United States Fleet in early 1940, I honestly was far more
JOR= interested and concerned about Asiatic nations and the Pacific
JOR= Ocean area and far better prepared to deal with these problems,
JOR= than with those of European nations and the Atlantic Ocean area.
JOR= Most naval officers were so minded and so prepared, since the
JOR= major portion of the Forces Afloat had been operating in the
JOR= Pacific Ocean areas for nearly ten years, and, for much longer,
JOR= Japan had been pinpointed as our next enemy.   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
JOR=      I realized that the world situation was worsening and that
JOR= the United States Fleet had responsibilities in both the
JOR= Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. I also realized from my
JOR= conversations with the President, and with those from whom I
JOR= learned of his conversations second and third hand, that the
JOR= President was greatly concerned with the growing power of
JOR= Germany and the deteriorating position of the western
JOR= democracies.
JOR=
JOR=      So, I kept my ear to the ground and sought to leave
JOR= Washington as much abreast of the situation as possible.
JOR=
JOR=      However, whatever my other qualifications, I was not one of
JOR= those whose foresight, at the June 1939 stage of events, could
JOR= foretell the swift shift of the Soviet Union to the side of the
JOR= fascist Hitler or the crushing German attack on Poland in
JOR= September of the same year.  I left Washington fearing that war
JOR= in the Pacific would come upon the United States before the Navy
JOR= could be prepared for it, but not expecting the war in Europe to
JOR= occur as soon as it did.
[...]
JOR= (c) The work of creating and bringing to full usefulness the
JOR= Pacific island air bases, which had been added to the ORANGE War
JOR= Plans back in 1937, had to be fully supported by the Fleet.
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^
[...]
JOR=      Shortly after the war started in Europe, the President (on
JOR= September 5, 1939), in accordance with existing law previously
JOR= approved by him, issued two Neutrality Proclamations.  From one
JOR= of these proclamations I wish to quote and then discuss it a
JOR= bit, as this was a typical Rooseveltian action; i.e., he
JOR= proclaimed one thing publicly and meant and did something quite
JOR= different.
[...]
JOR=      In mid-December 1939, the USS Tuscaloosa and other ships
JOR= trailed the German liner Columbus out of Vera Cruz and, acting
JOR= under OPNAV orders, gave regular broadcasts of her position so
JOR= as to furnish a point of contact for British combatant ships
JOR= seeking to locate and sink the Columbus.
[...]
JOR=      That action was wholly and completely incompatible with
JOR= "impartial neutrality," but the order for impartial neutrality
JOR= still stood for every naval officer to read.  The public in
JOR= general had the President's word in regard to impartial
JOR= neutrality, but the Forces Afloat of the Navy were being ordered
JOR= to act otherwise than in conformance with the President's public
JOR= word, and with the laws of the country.
[...]
JOR=      I believed: (1) The President had a responsibility to
JOR= arouse the country to face up to the unpleasant fact of
JOR= Hitlerism in the world and, (2) the vital interests of the
JOR= United States were more important than the President's personal
JOR= popularity or any political party's continuance in office.

 On the urge to check my dates before firing keys I did a quick
calculation, and found that the first operational breach of neutrality
toward Germany (the Tuscaloosa affair described above) happened a year
and a half before Bardossy's declaration of war on the SU (and two
years before that of on the USA).

-- Zoli, speculator-at-large

Thanks to all for the genealogy sources - I will try to learn what I can
about my family, since my mom is really resistant for some reason to
talk about the past.  Is this unusual?  Have other folk born here had
this experience with their parents?  My aunt is more willing to talk
but she came after WWII, and
my mom came after '56.  i don't mean to imply any connection, but these
may be relevant facts.

Paul Gelencser

Thanks, Steve.  This sounds like a great source for films.

Much thanks again,

        Paul Gelencser

In reply to your message of "Sat, 02 Jul 94 11: 19:58 EDT."
             >
Date: Sat, 02 Jul 94 11:54:33 -0700
From: 

Zoli Fekete writes:
>  Dear Greg, comrade-in-grey-cell

Actually, one day later I don't even understand my own question; once
again proving the truth of _in vino stupiditas_.  :-(

So let me try again:

>Obviously, with respect to the USA "jumping in" meant declaring war on
>them, which Bardossy did on Dec 12, 1941 (or about half a year Before
>Midway would I say without disabling my hindsight ;-)).

>The relevance of Midway in this context IMHO that it showed that the
>USA lacked neither the strength nor the readiness to enter the war with
>resolute force.


So your point is that Bardossy declared war (partly) because he thought
the US lacked strength and readiness?  Or?


-Greg

Dear Attila,

Taking the decisive point first:
> By October of 1941, the Germans had control over 35% of the Soviet
> population, 25% of the Soviet resources and about 30% of the Soviet
> industry.
 Ah, you mean two-third to three-quarter of the Soviet capacity
remained intact, after their most developed territory fell prey to the
surprise offensive (and before their new facilities in the Ural and
Siberia kicked in) - that was *my* point, remember...

 Now on to the minor ones:
> Your theory on how the war was lost by Hitler is interesting but
> rather misguided.
 But I am on the lookout for guidence ;-)...

> You were right. Hitler did fight GB with rather a
> rather passive attitude.
 I am afraid to be thought right for the wrong reason here ;-(:
> First it became obvious at Dunkan(Spelling??), France. The British
> could not understand, how come Hitler let them evacuate their
> troops  while the German air superiority could have denied
> evacuation  procedures.
 It turned out that the Germans did not quite know how big a contingent
they trapped in Belgium, and wanted to preserve their main armored
force for the strike against France. Of course they did not "let
evacuate" but rather though that their superior air power would destroy
them. It failed to cause too much damage, or even to prevent their
moving accross the Channel.

> The reason was; secret negotiation was going on between the Germans
> and  the U.S. and also between the Germans and GB and Hitler did
> not want to  burn all bridges.
 This is more like an explanation not a reason; in any case when the
time came Hitler was preparing to invade, with his bombing campaign burning
pretty much any bridges that might have existed - but the air force
again failed to deliver the decisive blow the invasion plans were based
on.

> However, it is not true that the Allies were not equal on the
> Western Front since the very beginning. Both the French and the
> British equipments were superior that of the Germans.
 I do not think that asserted the Western front equipments, but I think
you are wrong - especially if we consider the real front as opposed to
the Maginot line where the best French-Anglo forces were deployed in
vain. If hindsight were not illegal in this game than I'd point out
that lagging in the area of the armored forces was especially serious
equipment-wise - but then they apparently did not know what to do with
them anyway ;-(.

> So it that respect, the strategy "Blitzkrieg" was responsible which
> included also the new military organizational structure introduced
> by  Germany, which became the model for the Allies after World War
> II, and  later for the rest of the world's militaries, such as
> combined air -  panzer attack with mounted infantry.
 This is true - the German tactical superiority certainly contributed
to the phenomenal success of the Western campaign. But that only shows
that the imppressions based on that had very limited use for the whole
war. After all, if you are tiny Belgium or little France, then you can
see the enemy crushing thru your Eastern border before breakfast and
then having dinner on the opposite end. If you happen to be Russia then
you just had the frontline pushed a few hundred miles away from their
base of operation toward your own. And in the little time they had
before the Stalingrad turnover, Stalin's guys could master tank warfare
rather well, the scoresheet says (actually, they started learning in
Spain) - you think it was conceivable that Hitler's enemies would let
him keep winning on that one trick?

> You said Germany's production could not match the Allies
> production, well once again consider. Germany did not start wartime
> production until after the battle of Kursk, which was in July of
> 1943. Why not?? Hitler was afraid that the German people do not
> like the Nazi's and he would be deposed of power by the German
> people.
 I am considering - considering - considering... So they could not even
fully use their industrial capacity, already smaller the the Allied one,
that they did have at their disposal. What was the point again?

> Germany could have won over Soviet Union even if all other
> historical events would have remained that same if;
>         1. Germany was welcomed at the first as liberators. If
> Germany would have promise Ukraines at least cultural independence
> lost of people would have joined the Germans against Stalin. Even
> like that the Axis recruited over 1,5 million (I was shocked when I
> got that information) people to fight against Stalin.
 Some did welcome them, but counting on much more support is really
streching it when even such staunch anti-Bolsheviks as Horthy regarded
their expansion an aggression not to be considered liberation. And even
a few million recruited here and there would not have meant much if
they were to be the poorly equipped, trained and discipled troops the
German satellites were.

>        2. Germany would have started wartime production.
 If they forgot about this nifty detail then deserved to lose ;-)...

>        3. Germany had at that time 9,5 million troops only 2,5-3,5
> million served on the Eastern Front.
 You left out the "if" part - what to do with the rest of the troops.
Amass all of them toward Moscow, leaving unguarded the hinterland with
it's perimeter surrounded by the Allies and the occupied territories
threatened by insurgency?

>         4. Hitler should have conducted strategic bombing of cities
> (The only reason the Germans entered Stalingrad to destroy the T-35
> tank factory - look what happened - could have been just bombed.
 This point has about everything wrong with it ;-). First of all, after
the summer of '41 the key factories were (re-)planted to the safety of
Ural caves and unreachable distances behind. Second of all, it is
questionable how much strategic bombing capacity the German did or
could have. They failed miserably in the battle of Britain. Much of the
remaining force was used in the battle for Moscow with not much to show
for it. As for Stalingrad, the main reason for the quest was its
strategic location, then of course prestige arose, so the tank factory
must have ranked pretty low on the list. And of course the whole thing
was rendered to rubble by bombing and artillery. Notwithstanding the
moving stories with heroic workers rolling the tanks off the line
straight to fight, with the bulk of the industry at safe distance
that factory could not be that significant.

>         5. The wastly superior Germany Navy could have bombed
> cities, destroy the Soviet Navy, sitting in ports.
 Now here is something new - all I heard so far was a grand total of
what, maybe half a dozen battleships (mostly "pocket" ones at that)
sneaked out to sea, with the primary goal of avoiding battle contact.
On the other side we had the Anglo fleet guiding their convoys to
ports, including Soviet ones.

>         6. Germans could have taken Leningrad in September 1941, on
> Hitler's order they did not.
 I guess you meant he needed some troops elsewhere along the enormous
frontline. The city itself did not
have all that big strategic
significance (objectively, that is - holding out was probably a boost
while failing to conquer bad for the morale) - eliminating the need for
blockading would have freed up the divisions bogged down there, but to
take it would've required taking away from forces attacking areas
deemed more important. In any case I already generously awarded
Leningrad, with the rest of the European territory to the Germans in
that alternate timeline where everything went well for them ;-( - I do
not see this adding much to the chances of final victory.

>         7. Germans could have taken Moscow in the Summer of 1942,
> they took Stalingrad.
 It's not clear how much better they could've done the second time; one
major motivation of turning southward was to get the oil supplies badly
needed. Then they wanted to turn around outflanking Moscow. But again,
I am giving away Stalingrad, and take Moscow as well, just to show
clearly the strategical picture in the best-case scenario for the
Germans: their army spent in the push all the way to the Ural, much
force bogged down to control the huge occupied areas and supporting
supply lines through the Soviet lands (mostly scorched). Behind the
Ural the revenge-hungry Red Army recuperating, military production
picking up steam and USA support pouring into the Northern seaports. A
short distance from the Fatherland, just over the Allied-controlled
Channel the "unsinkable carrier" Britain is preparing for revenge, too.
And behind the safety of two oceans sitting the United States, whose
tremendous investments into the war would only earn return in the case
of Allied victory.

 So how exactly Germany could have won?

-- Zoli, ever-intrigued

Dear Greg,
>> The relevance of Midway in this context IMHO that it showed that
>> the  USA lacked neither the strength nor the readiness to enter the
>> war with  resolute force.
> So your point is that Bardossy declared war (partly) because he
> thought the US lacked strength and readiness?  Or?
 I do not lend my gray cells to speculate what kind of thinking, if
any, he did. The point is: a responsible statesman should've thought
long and hard about taking his country into war against such an
overmatching opponent as the USA (or the SU before). The act only makes
sense if the irritated Goliat won't be able to respond effectively -
something that ought've seen unlikely then, even without our hindsight.
So what he did made no sense and could only hurt the country.

-- Zoli

In article > Istvan Kertesz
> writes:
>
>When the Hungarian team did not qualify for the World Cup, I
>accepted it as sad reality. After all, Russia always had a stronger team,
>and Greece beat Russia. But now, while watching the performance of these
>two teams (so far 2 losses each, with 13 goals against, and 1 measly goal
>for Russia) I feel that two such teams placing ahead of Hungary in
>the qualifiers is just embarassing.

Hehehe, Sweden beat the s**t out of Russia ! (3-1, methinks...) :-)

/stefan

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 Stefan Gimeson     UNet:    | Let's build a nightmare-nation
 Tunavagen 39 B660         | learn and work as never yet !
 S-223 63 Lund     Voice:(0)46-394280        |           L  I  F  E
 Sweden (XTCIZNRG4U)  EC in '94 ! Vote YES!! |   *the ultimate VR experience*
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 -

----- Forwarded Message
Path:
news.worldlink.com!psinntp!rutgers!concert!inxs.concert.net!taco.cc.ncsu.ed
u!gatech!howland.reston.ans.net!paladin.american.edu!auvm!PITT.EDU!votruba+
From:  (Martin Votruba)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.slovak-l
Subject: C/E Europe OECD Forecast
Message-ID: >
Date: 30 Jun 94 16:32:17 GMT
X-Sender: Discussion of Slovak issues >
Lines: 34
Comments: Gated by 
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released
the following figures on 6/30/94 in Vienna:


 OUTPUT             1992      1993      1994      1995
 Slovakia           -7.0      -4.1         0         2

 Bulgaria           -7.1      -4.0         0         0
 Czech Republic     -6.6      -0.3         2         5
 Hungary            -5.0      -1.0         1         2
 Poland              2.6       4.0         4         3
 Romania           -15.4       1.0         0         1

 INFLATION          1992      1993      1994      1995
 Slovakia             10        23        16        15

 Bulgaria             80        64        75        40
 Czech Republic       11        21        11        10
 Hungary              23        22        19        17
 Poland               43        37        30        25
 Romania             210       295       170        80

 UNEMPLOYMENT       1992      1993      1994      1995
 Slovakia           10.4      14.4        16        16

 Bulgaria           15.2      16.3        17        17
 Czech Republic      2.6       3.5         5         7
 Hungary            12.3      12.2        11        11
 Poland             13.6      15.7        16        15
 Romania             8.4      10.2        13        15


Martin


----- End of Forwarded Message

Does anybody know where he is and what he is doing?

Greg,

        Csonka Magyarorsza1g nem orsza1g,
        Ege1sz Magyarorsza1g mennyorsza1g.

was the Hungarian verse, not with "Nagy" - the extra syllable needed for the
rhytm, and the none-too-subtle extra semantical load ('whole' as opposed to
'great'="nagy") is significant, too.

 An interesting story about the Horthy-songs is that according to people in
the know (for us poor conscripts could care less ;-<) they survived in
the "People's" Army with altered lyrics.

-- Zoli, the all-colorful Fekete

Didn't my ex-history colleague Be1la Kira1ly go back to Hungary and win
a seat in parliament?  But this is old memories, I have no idea what has
happened to him now.

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew

This whole discussion reminds me of a story from Chile, during the Allende
times. A campesino is taking the exam after some indoctrination. The first
question is, what would you do with this big cattle ranch. The answer was,
I would slaughter a few cattle and have a feast, while I would explain to
all the workers, how advantegous it will be to convert the ranch into a
state farm. Excellent!
The next question is, what would you do with this big hacienda. The answer
was, I would give a small plot to each campesino (probably to let Jose
drink a little wine), and convert the rest into a big cooperative.
Excellent!
Now lets take this case with the fellow who has two chickens.
But I have two chickens, shrieks the campesino.

That much for the equitable redistribution of wealth.

The nazis took it away and then gassed (or tried to if you were lucky)you.
Tha commies took it away, deported you (if you were lucky) and asked you to
say it is the greatest thing that ever happened to you
The liberals think that they have an obligation to talk you into giving it
away.

Unfortunately, after it is given away, they all think that it was generated
by exploitation only, and when they do not generate any wealth by
exploitation alone, they are all surprised and want to give it back, so
they can start all over again.

Regards,Jeliko.

Well, one more for the road:

I never met a liberal, who called himself that, and was one.

Regards,Jeliko.

Andras Kornai writes:

> > I am not so sure that the implied "inferiority in military and economic
> > potential" was a widely held view in those days and with the exception
of
> > the US it was not true for the rest of the group. Have you read Lukacs'
> > "The Duel"
> I've looked at it and I think the very concept of pitting Churchill
against
> Hitler puts too much emphasis on personalities. I don't think Germany had
> the manpower to pacify and hold on to Europe (remember, it just goes out
and
> out till the Urals) much less to win it.

IMHO the Duel is interesting in the aspect of how much of the British were
considering an arrangement with Hitler. I think Churchill's personality,
had a lot to do with the turning of Britain into harder resisatnce to
Hitler. It was not so evident from the contemporary info that it would have
happened otherwise.
Again for the French public opinion re the beginnings of the war, please
see Koestler's book the Scum of the Earth. It is a good eyewitness account.
There was basically no popular support in France to fight, regardless of
the (IMHO questionable) technical superiority of the Frnch military. The
people ( and most of the establishment) just plain did not want to fight.

>And of course there is this caveat
> about the US -- one of my main points (made to Greg who said he'll check
it
> out) was that there was no chance of the US staying out, and people knew
> that everywhere in Europe, the US having been the main guarantor of the
> peace Germany (and Hungary) wanted to rewrite. In the US there have been
> a fair amount of isolationism before WWI and WWII, but when the chips
were
> down the US came in the first time and there was no reason whatsoever to
> suppose it won't the second time.

Please remember that even the League of Nation and the Versailles treaties
were not ratified by the US Congress. So it is not a correct statement that
the US in any way was a "guarantor" of the European status quo. There was
in fact a very strong public sentiment to stay out of the "European War"
based on the percieved futility of the previous war to end all wars. And I
am not talking here about the America First or the Bund characters, but the
public in general. Once the US was attacked, it was an entirely different
story. But that did not happen until Dec 1941. Even within Rosevelt's inner
circle, there was no clear support for assisting the Brits in the early
days. Please do not be mislead by the reverse "engineering" that was
created AFTER the war, to show unanymous support for the cause. Some of the
US propaganda was not too different from that of the other side. Before the
attack on Russia, even the left was following the party line and claiming
that the working class has nothing to do with the war.

> > You have no disagreement from me for the latter, what I was stating is,
> > that after WWI, the industry and commerce was dominated by the Jews in
> > Hungary and a large part of the middle class was also Jewish.
> No. It is true that people of Jewish origin played a large role in the
> middle class, in industry, and in commerce (though to say they dominated
I
> think is an overstatement) but these people were not *Jewish* they were
> *Hungarians*. Some of them (but not too many) had Jewish religion, but
most of
> them didn't. Some of them (but not too many) might have had Jewish
> self-identification, but most of them identified themselves as
Hungarians,
> were in fact highly patriotic Hungarians who would under no circumstances
> put loyality for some Jewish cause above loyality for the country.

> I think this is a major point, well worth stressing. Assimilation was a
very
> significant process, and Jews in Hungary have taken full advantage of the
> liberal laws of pre-WWI Hungary. To say that e.g. the von Neumann family
> wasn't Hungarian is to project racial laws back to a time when such laws
> were not in effect. Nazism aimed at reimposing racial criteria, but even
> that required looking at the grandparents. By the interwar years there
> practically nothing in the personal conduct of these people that could
serve
> as a reliable indicator of Jewishness: their mother tongue was usually
> Hungarian, their religion often Christian, they served, often with
> distinction, in the Hungarian army, they supported Hungarian patriotic
> causes, they married Hungarians as often as not, and of course they said
> they were Hungarians.

> I can see even Professor Mendelsohn ignore this point, as it makes people
> with strong Jewish patriotism very uncomfortable.  Counting "Jewish
> influence" by re-defining these people as Jews is just so much simpler.
Yet,
> for the larger part, they weren't Jewish, not as far as anybody (except
of
> course Hitler) was concerned, including themselves.  I will read
Mendelsohn,
> you might want to check out William McCagg's "A History of Habsburg Jews,
> 1670-1918" (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989) as it deals with
> this process of assimilation in quite some detail.

I'll discuss this with you after you have read Mendelsohn and I have read
McCagg.

> > the Horthy regime in its early and mid to late years could not have
been
> > supported by the right wing only and the bulk of the entire population
> > supported Trianon revision.
> I don't think the first part is correct: the system could, and did,
survive
> on right-wing support, but of course that right wing was the larger part
of
> the population that mattered (for how much the agrarian poor mattered is
> quite unclear -- besides, there is no reason to believe they were
uniformly
> left-leaning). As for people supporting Trianon revision, I agree. But to
> what extent the leadership needed to fuel this support as something they
can
> capitalize on (i.e. keep attention focussed on the outside enemy in
> preference to dealing with domestic problems) and to what extent was this
a
> reasonable thing to support are entirely different matters.

I think we are not discussing the same right wing. The right wing was anti
Horthy and pseudo socialist. It was many times oppressed by the Horthy
regime, Szalasi was jailed and the parties were de jure disbanded by the
government at times. IMHO it was this "keeping on leash" of the right wing,
that assured the regime's support by those who could be considered
"liberal". The mainstay was reactionary, but it was not per se the right
wing.

Attila writes:

> Little correction of George Anthony's posting. Germany did not reoccupied
> Sudetans but occupied it as the Sudetans was always part of Czech,
Bohman,
> Bohemia whatever you want to call it, which never before 1938 belonged to
> Germany. It did belong to Austria-Hungary, to Hungary, to the Holy Roman
> Empire etc, but not Germany.

Maybe. At the particular time of the Sudetenland incorporation into the
Reich, Austria was part of the Reich also after the Anschluss. Thus it
could be questionable what rights were also assumed by the Reich which were
"transmitted" from Austria. That is the only basis, I think the
"reoccupation" term may be used.

Regards,Jeliko.

Andras: I am not going to repeat some of the issues covered earlier. I
disgree with you on both the US dictated peace for Europe after WW I and on
the US desire to get into the WW II. I am not convinced either of the
theory, that the US government circles wanted the Pearl Harbor attack and
did something sinister to not to be ready. If you work long enough with
either the US Govt or the US military you can realize, that events like
that can happen through the sheer stupidity and the inertia of the system,
without "after percieved" reasons.

Regards,Jeliko.